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Abstract
Existing deep neural networks (DNNs), say for image classification, have been
shown to be vulnerable to adversarial images that can cause a DNN misclassi-
fication, without any perceptible change to an image. In this work, we propose
“shock-absorbing" robust features such as binarization (e.g., rounding) and group
extraction (e.g., color or shape) to augment the classification pipeline, resulting
in more robust classifiers. Experimentally, we show that augmenting ML models
with these techniques leads to improved overall robustness on adversarial inputs
as well as significant improvements in training time. On the MNIST dataset, we
achieved 14x speedup in training time to obtain 90% adversarial accuracy com-
pared to the state-of-the-art adversarial training method of Madry et al. [12], as
well as retained higher adversarial accuracy over a broader range of attacks. We
also find robustness improvements on traffic sign classification using robust feature
augmentation. Finally, we give theoretical insights for why one can expect robust
feature augmentation to reduce adversarial input space.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are used for various tasks, including image classification with ap-
plications to character recognition, traffic sign classification, and autonomous driving. However,
the pervasive use of DNNs has also raised concerns as to their robustness, and thus trustworthiness.
Namely, existing DNNs have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial inputs [20]. These are
inputs that, to a human, appear similar to each other, but are assigned different labels by the DNN.
Currently, there is an interest in designing networks that are robust to adversarial examples. Shafai et
al. argue that adversarial robustness is limited based on the dimensionality of the input space [18].
Schmidt et al. suggest that accurate, but not robust models are a result of an insufficient number
of training samples [17]. Under a theoretical model in which it is possible to learn an accurate
classifier from a single sample, they demonstrate that learning a robust classifier requires at least
O(
√
d) samples. This problem manifests itself during training as the classifier learns to rely on
predictive, but non-robust features. For example, Malhotra et al. added pixel noise to training inputs
based on the true label of the input and found that the classifier learned to value the position of the
noise pixel over any other feature when classifying the data [13]. Other works make similar findings,
showing that traditional training of classifiers, results in a classifier learning highly predictive, but
non-robust features and the classifier is thus exploitable [8, 5, 21, 2].
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a new approach, robust feature augmentation, as a
component of standard machine learning techniques. In this approach, we augment a classification
pipeline with robust features that are design to absorb most adversarial perturbations, thus improving
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the overall robustness of the classifier. Under a theoretical model, we provide results and characteri-
zations that help explain as to why this approach improves robustness. Our work is also interesting
in the light of recent works on certifiable robustness, for e.g., Cohen et al. [4] mention that “it is
typically impossible to tell whether a prediction by an empirically robust classifier is truly robust to
adversarial perturbations” however, with robust feature augmentation in the classification pipeline
itself, one can expect robustness to bounded adversarial perturbations, by construction.
Adversarial training, popularized by Madry et al., is the current standard approach for designing
robust machine learning models, in which L∞-bounded adversarial examples are generated during
training. However, adversarial training is costly. As an alternative approach, we suggest augmenting
a classification pipeline with robust features. Compared to Madry et al. [12], robust feature aug-
mentation without adversarial training achieved 80% adversarial accuracy 33x faster on MNIST.
Additionally, combining robust feature augmentation with adversarial training achieved a 14x training
time speedup for achieving 90% adversarial accuracy. Since robust feature augmentation works well
with any DNN, we can get higher accuracy compared to recent attempts at certifiable robustness [16]
on the MNIST dataset.
A concurrently developed approach is to create a dataset that only contains robust features [8].
Previously, this approach was shown to improve the robustness of a trained model, but required
precise manipulations of the dataset [5]. Using adversarial training on CIFAR, Ilyas et al. created
an adversarially robust model, from which they identified robust and non-robust features. They
removed the non-robust features from the dataset and showed that standard training on the robust
dataset improved adversarial performance by about 45% while decreasing test accuracy by 10%.
However, this approach improvement still failed to outperform the model adversarially trained on the
original dataset. In this paper, we choose to improve robustness by identifying robust features that
can be added directly to the classification pipeline, thus preserving standard training techniques. Our
intuition is that since adversarial examples are a human-defined phenomenon, robust features can
also be similarly defined.
Summary of contributions and outline of the paper:
• We define the notion of a robust feature, computed from an input. Informally, a robust
feature is a feature that does not change as input is adversarially perturbed. Typically, we
intend these features to be meaningful attributes such as color and shape of an object being
classified. But, it can also be a coarser categorization of the input that is expected to be
stable under permitted adversarial perturbations (Section 3).
• We show that a function computed on a set of robust features is also robust. In other words,
we can use robust features an an input for robust classification decisions (Section 3).
• We show theoretical connections between (1) adversarially-trained classifiers that attempt
to discover a non-linear separation boundary to maximize the separation between natural
inputs and (2) using robust functions to map natural inputs to "pure" natural inputs and then
using a linear classifier to separate the points (Section 3).
• On MNIST, we use a binarization function as a robust feature and show that it improves
the robustness of a standard classifier from 0% to 74.64% without any adversarial training.
For an adversarially trained classifier, binarization reduces the training time by 14x for
comparable adversarial accuracy and retains better accuracy as attack radius increases, e.g.,
87.13% adversarial accuracy vs 34.88% for  = 0.35 as compared to [12] (Section 4).
• On a traffic sign dataset, we design a robust color extractor to augment a standard traffic sign
classifier. Our augmented classifier prevents more than 90% of adversarial attacks between
signs of different colors (Section 4).
Before delving into the details of the main contributions of our work, we give an overview of useful
notation and definitions in Section 2.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we establish some notation and definitions that will be useful in the exposition of the
remaining paper. We often refer to the set {1, . . . ,m} as [m] for the ease of notation. We assume
there is an underlying data distributionD which the input set X ⊆ Rn belongs to and each x ∈ X has
a corresponding ground truth label y ∈ [k]. In particular, one can think of X as the set of inputs that
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(a) Original Image (b) Adversarial image (c) Original Image (d) Adversarial image
Figure 1: The MNIST image in (a) is correctly classified as a “4", however image in (b) is misclassified as an
“8", despite only minor visual distortions in the image. Similarly, the image in (c) is correctly classified as a
STOP sign, but the image in (d) is misclassified as German KEEP LEFT sign.
a human (or an oracle) is able to classify. We follow the supervised machine learning setup where
the basic goal is given a training dataset and corresponding labels (xi, yi)i∈[N ], learn a function
F : X 7→ [k], that is a good approximation for the unknown function f : X 7→ [k]. We will assume
that f is such that f(xi) = yi in the given data. More specifically, the goal is to seek to minimize the
loss over a random sample over the input space Px∼D(F (x) 6= f(x)), which is often approximated
by minimizing an empirical loss over a random training sample.
It has been shown that although highly accurate approximations of f(·) can be learned, these
approximations are not robust for with respect to perturbations of a majority of inputs. Let d(·, ·)
be a distance function that measures the distance between inputs in Rn and let us denote an -
neighborhood of x, B(x, ), as the set of points in X at a distance at most  away from x, i.e.,
B(x, ) = {z ∈ X | d(x, z) ≤ } for some given  > 0. We call a function robust if it does not
change its output over small neighborhoods around a subset of desired inputs P ⊆ X .
Definition 1. A function F : X → [k] is said to be robust over a subset P ⊆ X with respect to
 > 0 if for all x ∈ P: F (x) = F (z) for all z ∈ B(x, ).
We refer to P as “pure” inputs. Since the set of all possible inputs, X , encountered in practice is
assumed classifiable by a human (or an oracle), we can assume5 that X = ∪x∈PB(x, δ) for some
δ > 0. As an example, a constant function is robust over all inputs, by definition, however it may not
be accurate. For some large enough , the ground truth f(·) may itself not be robust, although it is
accurate. Combining accuracy and robustness, we can define an adversarial input as follows:
Definition 2. Given a ground truth function f : X → [k] and a learned classification function
F : X → [k], suppose F (x) = f(x) = f(z) for some z ∈ B(x, ) and F (x) 6= F (z), then z is an
adversarial example for the classification function F (·).
Suppose a function F is robust6 on a subset RF, ⊆ X with respect to  (i.e., F (x) = F (z) for all
z ∈ B(x, ), x ∈ RF,). By definition, any input in RF, cannot be an adversarial example for the
function F with respect to  and any arbitrary ground truth function f .
Ideally, we would like a robust classifier that is also accurate on this input space, i.e., a classifier
that minimizes the loss on pure inputs as well as the percentage of pure inputs that have adversarial
inputs. Increases in robustness may result in a loss of accuracy, and the goal is be to find a feasible
trade-off. For the rest of the paper, we will assume that  is chosen small enough such that perturbing
inputs in P within an -neighborhoods does not change the ground truth classification, and we would
like to compute classifiers that are robust over P .
3 Robust Feature Augmentation
We propose two general techniques of developing robust classifiers: binarization (Section 3.1) and
group feature extraction (Section 3.2). First, we propose that if the first stage of a deep learning
pipeline is robust to a class of perturbations, then the overall pipeline will also be robust against
those perturbations. An example of binarization is a simple rounding filter that, when applied to an
image, can remove perturbations on most pixels. Such a function is useful in images where there
5Note that by this definition, the classifiable set of inputs is not convex since convex combination of two
points in different neighborhoods may not lie in the neighborhood of any pure data point.
6A related notion is that of certifiable robustness that deals with the user being able to certify robustness of a
given classifier, in the sense of property testing [16].
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Figure 2: (a) Max-margin linear classifier, trained over pure data points P , results in large adversarial input
space. Binarizing test data to the nearest-neighbor in P before classification removes these adversarial inputs
completely. (b) When P is not known, binarization to the nearest lattice point reduces adversarial input space.
is a notion of a static background and only the presence of a single type of pixel defines the object.
Previous works have demonstrated that, for MNIST, binarization is remarkably effective in improving
adversarial robustness with respect to small pixel perturbations [3, 6]. We will present theoretical
reasons in Section 3.1 on why the use of a binarizer improves robustness even without requiring
adversarial training for the special case of a linear classifier, as well as present experimental results
on MNIST in Section 4 that show improved adversarial accuracy with this simple, yet powerful idea.
Our second proposal is a generalization of binarization: to use one or more simpler image features
(e.g., color and shape for objects) that are expected to be robust to adversarial perturbations. Consider
the domain of traffic sign images in the US: a standard STOP traffic sign is known to be predominantly
red and with octagonal shape. Traditional adversarial attacks on images change neither feature as
there is a constraint to maintain the visual appearance of the original input (e.g., Figure 1). Thus, it is
apparent that standard classifiers do not learn to prioritize these features, shape and color, for labeling
the sign. Rather, other predictive, non-robust features, are learned, which are then exploited by the
adversary so as to maintain the visual appearance of the STOP sign, while causing the predicted label
to change. Our goal, then, is to make classifiers more robust by explicitly factoring in any known
discriminating features that are robust to perturbations on a large subset of the input space.
3.1 Binarization
In order to remove spurious noise learned by a DNN, we propose binarization or a snapping of input
data to desired intervals. Experimentally, we found that about 82% of the pixels in MNIST images
are concentrated near 0 and 8% are concentrated near 1. The remaining pixels are somewhat evenly
distributed between 0.1 and 0.9. We observed that adversarial attacks often changed background
pixels, and if the changes were removed, the classifier would correctly label the example. Previous
work suggests that a binarization function, which rounds all the pixels to {0,1} based on a threshold,
can improve robustness of the resulting classifier [3, 6]. Although its name suggests rounding values
in [0, 1] to {0, 1}, we define binarization more generally:
Definition 3. Consider a set S ⊆ Rn. Any function b(·) that maps each data point in the input space
X ⊆ Rn to elements in S is called a binarizer, and b(x) is referred to as the binarization of x ∈ X .
Typically, S is chosen to be much smaller in cardinality compared to X . Suppose the binarizer
b is defined with respect to a distance d(·) such that b(x) is the nearest neighbor of x in S, i.e.
b(x) ∈ argminz∈S d(x, z). If S = P , we get a binarizer to map any data point to the nearest
neighbor from the pure set of points P . If S = {0, 1} and d(x, y) = ‖x− y‖∞ we get the vanilla
form of binarization where every pixel is rounded to 0 or 1. One could also define a binarizer with
respect to a threshold7, for e.g. b(x) = Ixi≥τ , which rounds each element to S = {0, 1} based on
whether the coordinate-wise value is less than threshold or not.
We show in Section 4 that the proposed binarization has a minimal effect on the standard accuracy
of the classifier, but greatly improves the adversarial robustness. Furthermore, binarization can be
combined with adversarial training. The combination achieved both an order of magnitude faster
7Here, IA is simply an indicator vector for whether A is true or not.
4
training time and higher adversarial accuracy as compared to Madry et al. [12], with similar test
accuracy.
Why does binarization help? To see why binarization works in practice, consider the example of
a support vector machine that computes a max-margin linear classifier. In Figure 2(a), suppose the
set of “pure" data points P are the green and red dots, and their -neighborhoods in the L∞ norm
are the colored squares enclosing them. In this example, the pure data points are linearly separable,
although the -neighborhoods are not. We depict the max-margin linear classifier with a solid line that
separates the green points from the red points. Clearly, this example has a large adversarial instance
space (pink, bright green regions in Figure 2(a)) which belongs to an −neighborhood of some pure
data point, however, these would be misclassified by the linear classifier. On the other hand, suppose
a data point was first binarized to nearest-neighbor in P , this would completely remove adversarial
instances and we could obtain a perfect classifier even with the underlying classification technique
being a support-vector machine. This point is important enough to be stated again:
Augmenting the classification pipeline with a nearest-neighbor mapping increases the power of linear
classification to allow non-linear separability (blue decision boundary in Figure 2(a)).
Note that the resultant model from augmenting binarization and linear classification (see Figure 3)
is not only powerful in removing adversarial samples but also does so in an interpretable way. We
formalize this example in the theorem below.
Theorem 1. Consider a max-margin classifier that is trained on {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 = P that is linearly
separable. Consider a distance function d : P × P → R and a parameter  > 0. For any two
data points xi, xj ∈ P , suppose that the d(xi, xj) > 2 whenever the ground truth labels yi 6= yj .
Consider a nearest-neighbor binarizer b(x) = argminz∈P d(x, z), and the max-margin linear
classifier L (trained over P), then the augmented classifier C(x) = L(b(x)) is robust over P with
respect to  and exact8 over the −neighborhood.
Figure 3: The MNIST model with a bina-
rization function b and classifier L.
The theorem holds because b(x) is uniquely (and correctly)
mapped to the original (unperturbed) data point using the
nearest-neighbor binarizer, and these are perfectly clas-
sified using C = L(b(·)) since P is linearly separable
(therefore L(·) did not introduce errors on data points in
P). Since the -neighborhoods of oppositely classified
points do not overlap, we are able to perfectly classify the
perturbed points using a linear classifier composed with
nearest neighbor matching.
In the case when P is not known, we use binarization to map training/testing data points to the
nearest points in a lattice, e.g., the set of all 0/1 vectors {0, 1}n. This binarizer naturally acts as a
regularizer for the output function since outputs in the neighborhoods of lattice points cannot change
with small perturbations. Classification boundary over 0/1 vectors is much simpler than over the
original (non-binarized) adversarial data. In our experiments, we augment a DNN with a lattice
binarizer, which already gives compelling experimental results without adversarial training. We
depict the reduction in adversarial input space in Figure 2(b).
3.2 Group Feature Extraction
A generalization of binarization is to extend the notion to a collection of features (such as color,
shape, size) that are found to be robust to perturbations. We think of a data point as a member in a
group defined by the value of such a feature (e.g.,STOP, DO NOT ENTER are members of the “red”
color group). Given a predominantly red US traffic sign, it will require a large perturbation to change
the majority of the sign to another sign color. However, unlike binarization to a lattice or P , features
like color or shape lie in a much smaller dimension, and lose the finer classification information. We
propose two architectures for classification that can incorporate robust group features: (i) intersection
of multiple group features, and (ii) augmentation with original classifier.
In the first architecture (Figure 4a), we propose to use multiple robust group feature extractors Ti each
of which feeds the feature into Gi to get a subset of possible labels. For example, suppose T1 extracts
the dominant sign color (e.g., red) then G1 can map the color to a set of possible road signs with
the color (e.g., map "red" color to {STOP, DO NOT ENTER}). This may not be enough information
8By exact, we mean no errors in classification.
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to get to the finer classification, however, adding another group extractor T2 (e.g., for shape) would
allow one to classify more precisely (e.g., identify STOP or DO NOT ENTER). The classifier output is
simply the intersection of the possible labels given the extracted robust group features. We show that
if all Ti are robust, the resultant classifier formed by intersection is also robust.
(a) Multiple group fea-
ture extractors
(b) Augmented classi-
fier design
Figure 4: Basic architecture of a robust classifica-
tion network using group classifiers.
Why do group features help improve robustness?
Recall that in Section 2, we defined F : X → [k] as
robust over a subset P ⊆ X with respect to  > 0 if
for all x ∈ P: F (x) = F (z) for all z ∈ B(x, ). For
a given classification task that attempts to classify to
labels in [k], a group feature extractor can be viewed
as a function T : X → [m] that is robust with respect
to γ   and maps to features in [m] (typically,
m < k). When referring to the architecture, we
also refer to T as a group feature extractor. The
intuition here is that, if a group feature is known, then
designing a feature extractor T , which is robust and
accurate, is an easier task than learning a robust and
accurate function F . Further, let G : [m]→ 2[k] map
to possible labels given a group feature in [m]. We
next show that the robustness guarantees naturally
follow under function composition of T and G:
Theorem 2. Consider a group feature extractor T : X → [k] that is robust on some subset of inputs
R with respect to γ > 0, and a potential-label mapping G : [m] → 2[k]. Then the composition
G(T (·)) : X → 2[k] is also robust on R with respect to γ.
Theorem 2 holds since the internal group feature extractor T acts as a shock absorber and the G
function is oblivious to the noise. Indeed for any z ∈ B(x, γ) for x ∈ R, T (x) = T (z) (due to
robustness of T ), and therefore, G(T (x)) = G(T (z)), i.e., G(T.) is robust on R with respect to γ.
Robustness guarantees also hold in the case of intersection of multiple robust features:
Theorem 3. Consider a set of robust feature extractors Ti : X → [k] that are robust on some subset
of inputs Ri with respect to γi, and a sequence of potential-labels mappings Gi : [m] → 2[k] for
i = 1, . . . , p. Then the classifier that results by intersecting these: C(x) =
⋂p
i=1Gi(Ti(·)) is robust
on R =
⋂p
i=1Ri with respect to γ = mini=1,...,p γi.
Theorem 3 holds trivially if R = ∅. Now consider x ∈ R and γ as defined. Then, for any z ∈
B(x, γ), we have Gi(Ti(z)) = Gi(Ti(x)) using Theorem 2. Therefore, C(z) = ∩pi=1Gi(Ti(z)) =∩pi=1Gi(Ti(x)) for all z ∈ B(x, γ) and x ∈ R.
One limitation of the above architecture is that we may not know sufficient robust features to make
an unambiguous classification. To address this, we propose the augmented architecture (Figure 4b).
Specifically, we deploy two networks in parallel, a group feature extractor of Figure 4a operating
in parallel with a standard classifier F . The output of group-based network will be classification
possibilities and we require outputs of F and G to be consistent with each other. This prevents
targeted attacks on x that change to a label /∈ G(T (x), e.g., changing a STOP label (red) to a TRAFFIC
LIGHT AHEAD (yellow) label, thus reducing adversarial attack space.
This idea itself is quite powerful since it helps the DNN flag outputs where there might be an
inconsistency: Consider an augmented classifier C(x) = F (x) ∩ G(T (x)). When C(x) = ∅
and G(T (·)) is exact (i.e., no errors), then we know that F (x) was definitely an example that was
misclassified. This can be very useful in practice, where a machine can flag a difficult instance of
data, and let an oracle (or a human) take over in these cases until F (·) can be made more accurate.
We formalize this in Appendix C. We show next that in some datasets, like US traffic signals, these
ideas can help develop more robust classifiers.
4 Experimental Results
In this section, we present two sets of experiments demonstrating how our robust feature theory can
be applied to improve classifier performance in an adversarial environment.
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Figure 5: The adversarial performance during testing (left) and training (right). Not shown in the figure: MAT
and BAT take approximately 10x more time per training iteration than BIN.
1. Binarization Augmentation on MNIST: We start with a simple classification task, digit classi-
fication on the MNIST dataset [14], and show that a binarization function both improves adversarial
robustness and reduces training time compared to adversarial training to achieve a similar level of
adversarial robustness. We use the pre-trained natural and adversarially trained MNIST classifiers
used by Madry et al. [12]. For the attack, we use the PGD momentum attack code created by Zheng
et al. [23]. Our experiments compare four models, two of which use proposed binary augmentation:
1. Natural Model (NATURAL): Madry et al.’s pre-trained natural classifier.
2. Madry et al.’s Adv. Trained Model (MAT): Madry et al.’s pre-trained robust classifier.
3. Binarized Natural Model (BIN): A natural classifier with a binarization function as the
first processing step, trained on the natural training data (no adversarial training).
4. Binarized Adv. Trained Model (BAT): A classifier with a binarization function at the
input, with the overall classifier trained on adversarially perturbed training data.
Table 1: The accuracy of each model evaluated
against the MNIST test set and L∞ perturbations
within  = 0.3.
Model Test Acc. Adv. Acc.
NATURAL 99.17% 0%
BIN* 98.93% 74.64%
MAT 98.04% 89.72%
BAT* 99.29% 91%
All models use the same model architecture (same as
used in [12]). BIN and BAT include a binarization
function, encoded as a step function centered at a
threshold τ , at the input of the network. Any pixel
which is below τ (τ = 0.5 by default) is set to 0;
else it is set to 1. For BAT and MAT, we generated
adversarial examples in B(x, 0.3) for any given x,
we run 100 iterations of the PGD attack with a step
size of 0.0075 and 20 random restarts. As in the
original experiments done by Madry et al. [12], an
adversarial attack on a particular input sample is considered successful if at least one of the 20
generated adversarial perturbations is successful in changing the predicted label. For BAT, since the
step function is non-differentiable, we use the Backward Pass Differential Approximation (BPDA)
technique to generate good adversarial examples, as suggested by Athalye et al. [1].
We first evaluated the test and adversarial accuracy of all 4 models for  = 0.3 (i.e., using PGD to
find adversarial examples for an input x within B(x, 0.3), see Table 1). We observe that binarization
greatly improves the adversarial accuracy of NATURAL from 0% to 74.64% despite no adversarial
examples being used during training. We see that BAT, the binarized implementation of MAT,
improved adversarial accuracy from 89.72% to 91.14%. Test accuracy was over 98% for all models.
We next measured the adversarial accuracy of all four models for different values of  between 0 and
0.5. We emphasize that MAT and BAT are still trained for  = 0.3; only the attacker’s capabilities
are changed. In Figure 5, we see that binarization is likely reducing attack space for large  (e.g., BIN
outperforms MAT when  = 0.35 with adversarial accuracy of 64.11% versus 34.88%, respectively).
Also, adversarial training used with binarization further improves the robustness of the classifier (e.g.,
BAT has an adversarial accuracy of 87.13% for  = 0.35, more than double that of MAT).
The above findings can be particularly important in settings where adversarial training is infeasible,
say for learning on edge computing devices with smaller computational budget. BIN itself, with
no adversarial training, results in a significant initial adversarial robustness. In MAT and BAT,
each iteration of training is much more expensive since a PGD attack is executed to create a set of
7
adversarial training examples. To further analyze the training efficiency, we evaluated the adversarial
accuracy every 300 training iterations for both binarized models and MAT9. Adversarial examples
with  = 0.3 were generated using 100 iterations of the PGD attack with a step size of 0.0075
and no random restarts10. These results are shown in Figure 5. We observe that although MAT
starts achieving a higher adversarial accuracy than BIN after about 30,000 iterations, each training
iteration for MAT took 236 ms versus 22 ms for BIN. As a result, BIN achieved 80% adversarial
accuracy after about 2.9 minutes of training versus 96 minutes of training for MAT. In BAT, where
binarization is used during adversarial training, we see large reductions in training time required for
comparable adversarial accuracy. BAT achieved 80% adversarial accuracy in about 3.6 minutes and
90% accuracy in about 19 minutes. MAT only achieved 90% after 273 minutes of training (14x
slower than BAT).
2. Group Feature Extraction: We now move to a more complex task, traffic sign classification,
and demonstrate how a using a robust function to extract a robust feature, the dominant color of
a sign, can help reduce the adversarial attack space, e.g., preventing attacks that would change a
classification across colors (e.g., red STOP to a blue MINIMUM SPEED 30 sign in Germany).
Based on the architecture shown in Figure 4b, we augment a traffic sign classifier with a robust
feature extraction pipeline, responsible for determining the dominant color of the sign and mapping
the color to a set of possible traffic signs. Simply described, the color extractor first determines the
sign’s position in the image. Once located, it assigns each pixel a label based on the closest color
center in the hue color space, either “red", “blue", or “yellow", then outputs the color based on a
weighted majority vote. A more detailed description of the extractor can be found in the appendix.
Table 2: # Adv. image is the number of adver-
sarial images ( = 8) in which the predicted label
matched the adversarial target. The correction rate
is the percentage of adversarial examples for which
the color extractor outputs red.
Adversarial Target # Adv.Images
Correction
Rate
Blue Signs (GTSRB) 13633 93.53%
Yellow Signs (LISA) 2389 95.33%
Total # of Stop signs 3021
We train a traffic sign classifier on a dataset composed
of traffic sign images from both the LISA [15, 11] and
GTSRB sign dataset [7, 19] (normal training). We
then perform 20 iterations of a targeted L∞-bounded
PGD attack with  = 8 and step size of 2. The goal is
to perturb a STOP sign into a target sign class that is
either blue or yellow. The performance is evaluated
on 9 target sign class (8 blue sign classes, 1 yellow
sign class) and reported in Table 2.
Overall, the color extractor prevents over 93% of
above adversarial attacks that change STOP to a blue
or yellow sign (Table 2). Of course, an attacker could
attempt to adversarially attack the color extractor’s
robustness assumption. Using the same set of STOP sign images, we explored the edges of the
-neighborhood ( = 8) for each image and checked if the color extractor’s output changed at any
point. From this, we found that the extractor is robust on approximately 75% of the STOP sign
images. The ones that are not robust were poorer quality images, e.g., very dark images, a potentially
preventable problem by requiring better lighting and using better cameras. We include robustness
measurements for attacks on color for different values of  in Appendix B.
Conclusion The existence of adversarial examples is attributed to a network’s reliance on predictive,
but easily exploitable, features it learned during training. In this work, we introduced two methods of
robust feature augmentation to mitigate this problem: binarizers and robust group features. Both map
the input space to a smaller, more robust, subspace (like a lattice or group labels) and we formally
describe these two methods to improve DNN robustness. Experimentally, we demonstrated how
these methods can improve the adversarial robustness of a digit classifier and a traffic sign classifier.
Furthermore, when adversarial training is used in conjunction with these methods, we were able to
train a more adversarially robust model for MNIST 14x faster than without these methods.
We recognize that human identification of robust features may not be applicable to all machine
learning tasks, especially if non-interpretable, robust features exist. As such, it is important to develop
techniques to identify such features, though doing so is beyond the scope of this work. However,
concurrent work done by Ilyas et al. has already shown some progress in this area, through the use of
9All training was done on a 12GB Titan X Pascal GPU
1040 iterations with a step size of 0.01 is about twice as fast, but the adversarial accuracy of the model suffers
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adversarial training to remove non-robust features from training data [8]. We expect to see further
research, in which robust feature augmentation can be the method for adversarial robustness.
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A Additional Background
Adversarial Training Madry et al. [12] proposed the use of adversarial training in which they
solve
min
θ
ρ(θ), where: ρ(θ) = E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈S
L(θ, x+ δ, y)
]
In their formulation, S is the set of allowed perturbations. The loss function L quantifies the loss
relative to the perturbed input x+ δ and the original label y. The inner maximization problem seeks
to find a perturbation δ that maximizes the loss for a given input x. The outer minimization problem
aims to find the model parameters θ such that the expected adversarial loss in the inner maximization
problem is minimized.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) Adversarial training of a model on input x requires generating
an adversarial example and then training the model on the adversarial example. Madry et al. use the
PGD attack to generate adversarial examples [12]. The PGD attack is an iterative method in which at
each step t the input xt is modified based on the negative gradient of the loss function:
xt+1 = IIx+S(xt + α sgn(∇xL(θ, xt, y)))
S is the set of allowed perturbations as defined previously. IIx+S is a clip function, which ensures the
perturbed input xt+1 is within the allowable range.
B Traffic Experiment Details
B.1 Traffic Sign Dataset
Traffic signs are fairly standard across counties (e.g., see https://www.autoeurope.com/
roadsigns/ for classes of traffic signs and examples). LISA [11, 15] and German Traffic Sign Recog-
nition Benchmark (GTSRB [7, 19]) are two popular traffic sign datasets that have been extensively
used in previous studies.
We created a traffic sign dataset using images from both the LISA traffic sign dataset [11, 15] and the
German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB [7, 19]). The LISA dataset contains images of
47 different U.S. traffic signs. However, there are large class imbalances (e.g.,STOP has 1821 images
and SPEED LIMIT 55 has 2 images). To address this problem, we first combine the LISA training and
GTSRB training dataset, which has images for 43 German traffic signs classes. The image labelled as
STOP in both datasets are combined as they have the same visual appearance. Similarly, the images
labelled as DO NOT ENTER and STREETCLOSEDONEWAY are combined.
The combined dataset still has low representation for some of the individual U.S. traffic signs. To
address that, we created two superclasses composed of white rectangular U.S. traffic signs and yellow
U.S. traffic signs. The first superclass contains U.S. Speed Limit signs and RIGHT LANE MUST
TURN. The second superclass cotnains U.S. Warning signs and SCHOOL, which are yellow. The 45
class labels in the augmented dataset are provided in Table 3.
With respect to the color extractor, we focused on signs of one of three dominant colors: red, yellow,
and blue. U.S. red signs are generally regulatory in nature (e.g., STOP, DONOTENTER) and some
examples are shown in in Figure 6a. U.S. yellow signs (see Figure 6b) are used for cautioning
a user (e.g., INTERSECTIONAHEAD, CURVERIGHT, CURVELEFT, SCHOOL ZONE). Blue signs
(see Figure 6c) are common in Germany and can be restrictive or mandatory (e.g., KEEPLEFT,
MANDATORYLEFTTURN, TRAFFICCIRCLE , MANDATORYAHEAD). Table 4 identifies the sign
labels in the modified dataset and that are either red and blue. For the purpose of classification, yellow
signs are grouped together in a single class due to low representation with respect to the original sign
labels(e.g.,INTERSECTION: 13 images, CURVELEFT: 24 images, TURNRIGHT: 24 images).
B.2 Model Description
We use a publicly available implementation of a multi-scale DNN architecture [22]. The architecture
description is given in Table 5. Before training, we triple the size of any class with less than
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(a) Red sign examples
(b) Yellow sign examples
(c) Blue sign examples
Figure 6: Examples images of signs for the three color classes we evaluated.
Table 3: Class labels of the LISA-GTSRB traffic sign dataset used in the experiments.
Class Label Class Label Class Label
speedLimit20 streetClosedBothWays wildlifeWarning
speedLimit30 noTrucks allRestrictionsEnd
speedLimit50 generalWarning mandatoryRightTurn
speedLimit60 sharpLeftTurnAhead mandatoryLeftTurn
speedLimit70 sharpRightTurnAhead mandatoryAhead
speedLimit80 sequenceSharpTurnsAhead mandatoryAheadOrRight
endSpeedLimit80 bumpsInRoad mandatoryAheadOrLeft
speedLimit100 slipperyRoad keepRight
speedLimit120 tighterRoadOnRight keepLeft
noPassing construction trafficCircle
noPassingTrucks trafficLight endNoPassing
intersectionWarning pedestrianCrossing endNoPassingTrucks
rightOfWay schoolCrossing Yellow Signs
yield bicycles doNotEnter
stop icyRoads White Rectangles
Total # of Signs 44121
200 images through oversampling and random perturbations of each image. We use K-fold cross-
validation with 10 splits and for each split, we train the model 50 times over the entire training split.
Our trained model has 97.51% test accuracy based on the GTSRB test dataset containing 12630
images. Our model was not adversarially trained, but the augmented pipeline does allow for an
adversarially trained classifier, which may further improve robustness.
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Table 4: Red and blue sign groupings. Yellow is not included as they have been grouped into a single label with
respect to classification.
Red Blue
Stop mandatoryRightTurn
Do Not Enter mandatoryLeftTurn
mandatoryAhead
mandatoryAheadOrRight
mandatoryAheadOrLeft
keepRight
keepLeft
TrafficCircle
Table 5: Traffic sign model architecture. The model expects 32× 32× 3 images as input with values
in the range [-0.5, 0.5].
Layer Type Number of Channels Filter Size Stride Activation
conv 3 1x1 1 ReLU
conv 32 5x5 1 ReLU
conv 32 5x5 1 ReLU
maxpool 32 2x2 2 -
conv 64 5x5 1 ReLU
conv 64 5x5 1 ReLU
maxpool 64 2x2 2 -
conv 128 5x5 1 ReLU
conv 128 5x5 1 ReLU
maxpool 128 2x2 2 -
FC 1024 - - ReLU
FC 1024 - - ReLU
FC 43 - - Softmax
B.3 Color Extraction Algorithm
We designed a basic color extractor for traffic sign classification. The extractor involves 2 steps:
1. Sign Localization - Determine the sign’s location in the image
2. Color Classification - Determine the dominant color of the sign
The full pipeline is shown in Figure 7.
B.3.1 Sign Localization
Before we can evaluate the dominant color of the sign, we must first identify which pixels in the image
correspond to the surface of the sign. Due to the presence of noisy image, like those shown in Figure
9, edge detection and contour extraction algorithms perform poorly. Instead, given a three channel
color image, (r,g,b), we normalize each individual channel by the image intensity and compute a
chromaticity map (C) and 4 color maps (R, G, B, Y) [9, 10].
C = max(r, g, b)−min(r, g, b)
R = r − g + b
2
G = g − r + b
2
B = b− r + g
2
Y =
r + g
2
− |r − g|
2
+ b
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Figure 7: The color extractor pipeline. We show the step-by-step process for a STOP image.
Afterwards, all of the maps are converted to a binary image based on the mean of the non-zero values
in each map. We use the binary image of C as a mask on each of the binarized color maps to isolate
the chromatic colors in each map. Finally, each channel is scored based on the number of non-zero
pixels in the image. If less than 10% of the pixels in each of the four color channels are white, the
inverted binary chromaticity map is output. Otherwise, the binarized color channel with the highest
score is output. We make one optimization based on the fact that in most of the images, the traffic
sign is centered in the image. As such, we restrict thresholding and scoring to a small box around the
center of the image. In our experiments, we used a 10 by 10 box.
B.3.2 Color Classification
The output of the sign localization step is to mask the original color image, and remove background
pixels during color extraction. The image is converted to a hue-based representation (e.g., HSV or
HSL). Three predefined color centers (red, yellow, and blue) are used to label each non-zero pixel in
the masked image based on the closest color center. Afterwards, a weighed weighted majority vote is
computed (i.e., weight of a pixel’s vote increases the closer it is to the center) and the color with the
most votes chosen.
For these proof-of-concept experiments, we choose to only detect red, yellow, and blue as these are
the three most common colors in the dataset. We did not handle colors such as brown or green as
there were no signs in the dataset with these colors. Traffic signs that are white do exist, but white is
not characterized by hue, but is instead based on the values of the other channels. As such, the color
extractor is not robust for predominantly white signs, thus our analysis did not focus on such signs.
This does not hurt the test accuracy of the augmented model, though, as we can include “white" sign
labels in the group-labels for all three colors. When we augment the classifier with the color extractor,
the test accuracy on the GTSRB test dataset is still 97.51%. Extending the color extractor to extract
other colors, or even multiple colors, for finer-grain color-based classification, is future work.
B.4 Robustness of the Color Extractor
In Section 4, we presented the results on the robustness of the color extractor on STOP images for an
L∞-bounded attack with  = 8. The evaluation involved shifting one or more color channels by  in
both the positive and negative directions. In Figure 8, we show the measure of the color extractor
on STOP images for varying values of . We observe that the robustness of the color extractor is
extremely high for small values of , and then steadily decreases. Upon closer examination, we find
that many of the points the color extractor is non-robust on for small values of  are points that are very
close to a different color boundary, often due to noisy images. We provide a few examples in Figure
9. In some cases, like in Figures 9a and 9b, the sign has a blueish tint, often due to poor lighting.
In other cases, like Figure 9c, the blurriness hinders correct sign localization (see Section B.3.1).
The differences between robustness for blue and yellow for higher  values is due to a smaller hue
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Figure 8: The robustness of the color classifier for STOP when changing to blue or yellow signs as
L∞ bound increases.
(a) Close to Blue (b) Close to Blue (c) Close to Yellow
Figure 9: Some examples of inputs the color classifier is not robust on. Often, this occurs due to
either the image being too dark (which tends to shift colors to blue) or the image being too blurry
(which causes errors during sign localization).
distance between red and yellow as compared to between red and blue. For smaller values of , the
difference is due to dataset artifacts – more STOP signs with very poor lighting in the dataset were
closer to having a bluish hue than a yellowish hue (see Figure 9 for a few examples).
C Additional Theorem
Theorem 4. Consider a classifier F : X → [k] and suppose we have access to a group feature
extractor T : X → [m] as well as a labels mapping G : [m] → 2[k]. Consider the augmented
classifierC(x) = F (x)∩G(T (x)). If T (·) is robust overP with respect to γ, then for all z ∈ B(x, γ),
C(z) is non-empty if and only if F (z) ∈ G(T (x)).
Above theorem holds because robustness of T (.) implies robustness of G(T (.)) from Theorem 2.
Thus, the label of C(.) for both x and z ∈ B(x, γ) must be in G(T (x)), ruling out targeted attacks
that change label of F (x) to a label not in G(T (x)).
As an example scenario of the above theorem, suppose x ∈ P is an image of a STOP sign. T (x) is
determined to be red. Then, G(T (x)) is the set of sign labels that can be red, e.g., a set including
the STOP sign and DO NOT ENTER sign. Let’s assume that normal case that F classifies the sign
x correctly. Then, C(x) will also give a correct classification. Furthermore, for an arbitrary input
z ∈ B(x, γ), since G(T (z)) = G(T (x)) due to robustness of T , label of C(z) is restricted to be
either ∅ or in the set of red signs, G(T (x)). C(z) = ∅ implies an inconsistency between the two
outputs of F and G(T (·)) on input z, suggesting a problem, which may require human inspection or
another intervention to resolve. A non-empty result implies that the two inputs are of the same color,
though not necessarily the same label.
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